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Governing Through Failure and Denial: The New Resilience 
Agenda 
 
Resilience has spread so quickly through policy making that it has taken on the appearance of a new 
paradigm for intervention and problem solving. Given the rapid proliferation of usage in a variety of 
contexts, a precise definition of the term is now impossible. The World Bank talks of resilience in 
terms of ͚ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽƌĞĐŽǀĞƌĨƌŽŵŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƐŚŽĐŬƐǁŚŝůĞƌĞƚĂŝŶŝŶŐŽƌŝŵƉƌŽǀŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌ
fuŶĐƚŝŽŶŝŶŐ ?.1 In a slightly broader sense it can be understood as  ‘ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂů ?Ă
household, a community, a country or a region to withstand, adapt, and quickly recover from 
stresses and shocks such as drought, violence, ĐŽŶĨůŝĐƚŽƌŶĂƚƵƌĂůĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ ?.2 This definition by the 
European Commission applies the idea to international development and emergency support and it 
is to this area that the article mainly relates. Looking at the arguments of the EU, World Bank, the 
h< ?ƐĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?&/ ? and other international actors, it suggests 
that the notions of failure and denial capture two important ways in which the dominant narrative 
on resilience applies itself to the international domain. It looks at the opportunities and possibilities 
resilience offers human agents and suggests that these come at the price of being able to influence 
the bigger picture. 
 
A review of the academic literature can reveal two broad attitudes to resilience. One understanding 
sees resilience as a radical new approach that opens up new ways of thinking and understanding. If 
not wholly positive about what these developments might represent, this view does tend to 
emphasise a view of resilience as opportunity and possibility. A more negative view of resilience, by 
contrast, emphasises the way it restricts our opportunities to act and creates compliant subjects 
who fit the conditions created by neoliberal capitalism. This latter view is the dominant one among 
the critical scholars who, applying Foucault, tend to coalesce around the view that resilience is a 
form of neoliberal governmentality producing neoliberal subjects.
3
  
 
The first approach is not so straightforward however. There is a dominant approach to resilience 
that starts from the ecology literature and emphasises systemic adaptation. This view takes a 
positive view of resilience as offering opportunity for reflexive and adaptive behaviour. However, 
this is founded upon a rather negative picture of the world as uncertain and unpredictable. Critics 
would also argue that the mainstream resilience literature represents a rather technical and 
apolitical approach that obscures the power relations behind complex system dynamics and 
depoliticises the social context within which adaptive behaviour occurs.
4
 However, there is also a 
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Commission, 2012), 1. 
3
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more critical understanding of resilience that recognises how tying resilience to a more political 
ůŽŐŝĐ ĚŽĞƐ ŶŽƚ ŵĞĂŶ ŝƚ ŝƐ  ‘ŝŶƚƵŝƚŝǀĞůǇ ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂů ? ? ƚŚĂƚ ŝƚ ŵŝŐŚƚ challenge neoliberal logics, may 
 ‘ƵŶďůŽĐŬ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂůƐƚĂůĞŵĂƚĞƐĂŶĚƵŶůĞĂƐŚƵŶŬŶŽǁŶŚƵŵĂŶƉŽƚĞŶƚŝĂůŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?5 Critics of resilience 
perhaps too readily tie resilience to an unproblematic neoliberal meta-narrative and over-look its 
radical potential within other logics of governing.
6
 
 
The first approach can be seen as operating under conditions of complexity and human 
adaptability, with various opportunities for human creativity. The second approach is more 
negative and sees these as being limited and constrained by resilience and its associated practices. 
This view sees resilience as part of a broader network of governmentality, often of a neoliberal 
character. The emphasis is more on the conditions, context, and perhaps the structures that enable 
and constrain activities. Rather than representing something radically new, this view tends to see 
resilience as consistent with (or modifying) existing methods of (neoliberal) governance. It is this 
approach that fits with the themes of failure and denial. However, a critical reading of the 
governance context within which resilience operates does not necessarily mean that resilience 
does not offer some positive opportunities. The argument of the article is that resilience thinking 
does indeed offer human agents certain possibilities, but this tends to be confined to the subjective 
realm of the everyday and offers this precisely in order to deny that we can be effective agents in 
the wider world. 
 
Failure and denial are two very apt ways of describing the focus of this form of international 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶ ? &ĂŝůƵƌĞ ƌĞĨĞƌƐ ƚŽ ƚǁŽ ĂƐƉĞĐƚƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ  ‘ďŝŐŐĞƌ ƉŝĐƚƵƌĞ ? ? &ŝƌƐƚ ŝƚ ƌĞůĂƚĞƐ ƚŽ Ă ƐĞƚ ŽĨ
ontological assumptions that tends to be understood through arguments about complex systems 
and wicked problems. Resilience thinking sees this in terms of a world of unpredictable events and 
uncertain outcomes. It suggests that we have very little control over these complex systemic 
failures and that consequently, faced with risk and uncertainty, we must govern ourselves through 
learning appropriate strategies of survival through adaptation. Second, resilience thinking links this 
general condition to failures of intervention, regulation and control. It rejects the established liberal 
framework of intervention whereby states and other institutions and organisations attempt to 
control and regulate their environment or to provide comprehensive security and protection. These 
perceived failures are used to justify governance through denial. In the case of international 
interventions, our inability control the wider environment or global context, with its crises and 
uncertainties coupled with a record of failed international interventions and patchy statebuilding is 
used to reinforce a strategy of adaptation that shifts responsibility (to adapt) on to poorer states, 
communities and individuals who have to learn how to better cope with their risks and insecurity. 
 
Denial takes on a new dimension in recent strategy by going beyond what Chandler in 2006 called 
 ‘ŵƉŝƌĞŝŶĚĞŶŝĂů ?ǁŚĞƌĞƐƚĂƚĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĨŽƌŵƐŽĨƌĞŐƵůĂƚŝŽŶǁĞƌĞƉƵƌƐƵĞĚďǇtĞƐƚĞƌŶƐƚĂƚĞƐĂŶĚ
international organisations through strategies that denied the power being wielded.
7
 The 
international community now goes further in denying that it has either the ability or the obligation 
to intervene and that its best role is to encourage (and monitor) responsible local agency. This does 
not mean outright rejection of previous approaches. This article argues that governance through 
failure and denial might be actually more effective in securing compliance to international norms, 
forcing states and local populations to adapt their behaviour in the face of problems that the 
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 KůĂĨŽƌƌǇ ‘From Defense to Resilience: Environmental Security beyond Neo-ůŝďĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ?International 
Political Sociology 8 (2014), 256 W274, 257. 
7
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international community either cannot, or does not want to deal with itself. Instead failure and 
denial are used to normalise the retreat from certain global and domestic obligations, while 
reinforcing the need for a certain type of governance in the face of significant shocks and threats 
which according to the UNDP,  ‘ĂƉƉĞĂƌƚŽŚĂǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞƚŚĞŶŽƌŵ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞĞǆĐĞƉƚŝŽŶ ? ?8 
 
To map this out, we start by making the case for the second approach which sees resilience in 
relation to governmentality. We then look at how resilience fits into the governance approach by 
examining its philosophical assumptions about the nature of the world and the way that we act. This 
leads to an examination of what resilience has to offer, accepting the view that it does add 
something extra to contemporary forms of governance. While suggesting that resilience derives its 
meaning from surrounding discourse and practices, it does offer modifications to these through its 
focus on knowledge, the social and the human. In acknowledging this, the article accepts the view of 
the first approach that resilience encourages human potential, but suggests that this is constrained 
by its position within a broadly neoliberal logic of governing. The argument is developed through 
the themes of governance through failure and governance through denial while the final section 
develops this in the context of global governance and international interventions. 
 
 
Resilience as governmentality 
 
While the idea of resilience has a number of origins, the ecology literature is most relevant to a 
focus on international intervention and such issues as natural disasters humanitarian intervention 
and development in particular. The ecological literature begins to challenge the model favoured by 
classical physics that emphasises the need to return to a state of equilibrium following a 
disturbance
9
. Instead it explores the ability of a system to reorganise itself in the face of shocks and 
stresses. So whereas engineering resilience is focussed on the return to one stable state or 
equilibrium, ecological resilience looks at how systems might reorganise and indeed change their 
states. Disturbance is seen in relation to its ability to change a system and thereby alter behaviour. 
Ecological resilience therefore looks at the movement from one form of stability to another and 
even raises the possibility of multiple states and continuous transformation.
10
  
 
Applying resilience to societies means placing emphasis on such things as social and system 
complexity, functional diversity, different emergent states, and nonlinear ways of behaving.
11
 
Complex systems are in constant motion with no one stable state, and subject to multiple externally 
imposed crises and shocks. While resilience has become associated with the ability to withstand 
ƐŚŽĐŬƐĂŶĚƚŽ ‘ďŽƵŶĐĞďĂĐŬ ?ƌĞĐĞŶƚĞŵƉŚĂƐŝƐŚĂƐŚŝŐŚůŝŐŚƚed the need to evolve and adapt to a 
constantly changing environment. It is suggested that notions of complexity and adaptation may 
well lead to a denial of the possibility of effective intervention to control the situation. While the 
ecology literature looks at external shocks such as global environmental change, a focus on societal 
forms of resilience would include such things as pandemics, economic shocks, terrorist threats and 
various other security challenges. The developing notion of societal resilience examines the complex 
                                                          
8
  UNDP Towards Human Resilience: Sustaining MDG Progress in an Age of Economic Uncertainty, (New York: 
UNDP, 2011), 1. 
9
  ?^ ?,ŽůůŝŶŐ ? ‘ZĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ^ƚĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĐŽůŽŐŝĐĂů^ǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ?Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, 4 
(1973): 1-23. 
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Mooney and Josep G Canadell (eds.) in Encyclopedia of Global Environmental Change Volume 2, The Earth 
System: Biological and Ecological Dimensions of Global Environmental Change: (Scientific Committee on 
Problems of the Environment (SCOPE) Publication, 2002): 530 W531, 530. 
11
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interactions between ecological and social systems
12
, their resource systems and organisations, and 
the societal awareness of these through reflexive understanding. In both cases, the resilience 
discourse works to focus attention on the uncontrollability of these problems and the need to work 
out how to operate in a world of increasing vulnerability and insecurity. Indeed resilience works to 
deny the possibility of securing ourselves and to instead create a sense of the need to continually 
adapt to threats and dangers that are beyond our control. It shifts attention from the liberal 
aspiration to influence planetary life and insure ourselves against its dangers to the neoliberal belief 
in the necessity of risk as a private good.
13
 
 
Advocates of societal resilience argue that the adaptive capacity of social systems depends on the 
nature of their institutions and their ability to absorb external shocks.
14
 Examining how institutions 
deal with external crises and their capacity to absorb shocks helps explain why resilience is 
attractive to policy makers. Focusing on institutions is important in engaging notions of reflexivity 
and responsiveness. Berkes, Colding and Folke go on to say that crises can actually play a 
constructive role in resource management because they force us to consider issues of learning, 
adapting and renewal.
15
 This constitutes the positive element that we identified within the 
mainstream literature (or first approach). Such arguments can be found in a wide range of policy 
documents and strategy papers. For example, the British think tank Demos argues that resilience 
ƐŚŽƵůĚďĞƐĞĞŶŶŽƚŽŶůǇĂƐƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŽƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇƚŽ ‘ďŽƵŶĐĞďĂĐŬ ? ?ďƵƚĂƐĂpositive 
process of learning and adaptation.
16
 Meanwhile the World Resources Institute defines resilience as 
 ‘ƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇŽĨĂƐǇƐƚĞŵƚŽƚŽůĞƌĂƚĞƐŚŽĐŬƐŽƌĚŝƐƚƵƌďĂŶĐĞƐĂŶĚƌĞĐŽǀĞƌ ?ĂŶĚĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ
ĚĞƉĞŶĚƐŽŶƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨƉĞŽƉůĞƚŽ ‘ĂĚĂƉƚƚŽĐŚĂŶŐŝŶŐĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚůĞĂƌŶŝŶŐ, planning, or 
ƌĞŽƌŐĂŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ?.17 Like Berkes, Colding and Folke it even suggests that resilience should be 
understood as the capacity to thrive in the face of challenge.
18
  
 
Although resilience approaches appear to be systemic in their arguments, in the social field this 
often works more as a framing device to justify certain approaches to governance. Scholars of this 
perspective argue that systemic change and uncertainty leads to the question of how governance 
arrangements can best cope with and adapt to ever changing conditions.
19
 It is accepted that the 
world has always been complex, but complex systems are now mediated through new levels of 
interconnectedness, flows of information, multiple layers of decision-making and new pressures on 
policy makers. In addition decision-making is perceived to be increasingly fragmented, badly 
coordinated and unable to deal with the speed of technical and ecological change.
20
 While one way 
of analysing this relationship would be to look at the deep rooted changes in the nature of complex 
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systems and try to explain how this influences governance, this article instead takes what we 
described as the second approach which connects resilience to changes in governance while asking 
what resilience thinking might presuppose about the wider world. To focus this way round is to 
start with strategies of governmentality, rather than with theories of things like complexity. It also 
better allows us to pay attention to the themes of failure and denial since these are now given a 
clear strategic character. 
 
To make this argument requires us to see resilience primarily as a tool of governance that operates 
in a certain way as defined by Foucauldian governmentality.  That is to say, it forms part of a 
governmentality strategy that operates from a distance
21
 by shaping expectations conducting 
conduct and measuring compliance with a set of international practices and norms. 
Governmentality assumes a liberal character insofar as it seeks to limit direct forms of governance 
by appealing to the governed to govern themselves in the most appropriate ways.
22
 This becomes 
embedded in a set of normative assumptions about individual conduct and responsible behaviour. 
ƉƉůǇŝŶŐƚŚŝƐƚŽĂƐƚƵĚǇŽĨƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŵĞĂŶƐůŽŽŬŝŶŐĂƚŚŽǁĂƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇǁŽƌŬƐ ‘ĨƌŽŵĂ
ĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?23 by appealing to responsible behaviour and self-reliance, in particular by placing 
emphasis on strategies of learning, awareness and adaptability in the context of possible crises, 
risks and insecurities. As a means of governance, we can examine how it might shift responsibility 
away from states and institutions and on to populations and communities. Governmentality draws 
ĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽƚŚĞǁĂǇƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞŐŽĞƐďĞǇŽŶĚĂƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂƚƚĞĂĐŚĞƐƵƐŚŽǁƚŽ ‘ďŽƵŶĐĞ
baĐŬ ?ďƵƚŝƐ ?ŝŶK ?DĂůůĞǇ ?Ɛ24 view, a new way of creating adaptable subjects capable of responding 
to and even taking advantage of situations of radical uncertainty. 
 
From a governmentality perspective, it can be seen why a resilience-based approach should place 
such emphasis on things like individual preparedness, information sharing, informed decision-
making, understanding our roles and responsibilities, showing adaptability to our situation and 
ďĞŝŶŐĂďůĞƚŽ ‘ďŽƵŶĐĞďĂĐŬ ?ŝĨƚŚŝŶŐƐŐŽǁƌŽŶŐ ?dŚĞƐĞĨŝƚǁŝƚŚŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐƚŚĂƚƉƵƚ
emphasis on us as having the freedom but also the responsibility that comes with governing 
ourselves in appropriate ways. Resilience, seen in relation to governance, is about encouraging 
active citizenship where people, rather than being dependent on the state, take responsibility for (if 
not necessarily control of) their own well-being. In particular, this relates to the risk and security 
aspects of governance and it operates through an appeal for preparedness, awareness and reflexive 
monitoring of our situation and our ability to respond. This is based on the assumption that there is 
little that we can do about the bigger picture and that we must instead focus on how to adapt to the 
complexities and uncertainties of a world we can no longer control or predict. It encourages 
assertive and enterprising activity at the micro level, while denying the possibility to intervene at 
the macro level of the system. As liberalism abandons its universalistic aspirations insecurity 
ďĞĐŽŵĞƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉĂůĚĞƐŝgn for governmental rĞĂƐŽŶŝŶŐ ?.25 
 
At one level, therefore, this works through a process of denial. It rejects those liberal or modernist 
understandings of state and society with their rationalist, top-down views of the role of the state, 
government, science and planning. Some theorists see this in terms of modernist versus 
postmodernist approaches. This is particularly relevant to disasters and overseas interventions. 
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Duffield
26
 sees the modernist approach as reliant upon scientific prediction and large-scale 
managerial response to geo-physical processes that seek to contain or minimise their impacts. This 
has given way to the view that modernist approaches have left us constantly exposed and 
unprepared. Disasters are now regarded as internal to societies and that accepting their immanence 
means learning how to adapt in order to survive. This is seen as a post-security situation where 
attempts to protect or secure are sure to lead to failure and may well do more harm than good.   
 
Instead of seeing a world that is amenable to human understanding, intervention and control we 
find an approach that blurs boundaries, as Chandler
27
 notes, between subject and object, culture 
and environment, agent and structure and public and private. As the next section shall argue, this 
view is based on a series of ontological assumptions characteristic of contemporary society and its 
associated theories and approaches to governance. However, rather than undermining the idea of 
governance, these arguments simultaneously deny that we can adequately grasp the complexities 
of the world through established liberal frameworks of understanding and intervention, while 
reinforcing the more neoliberal idea that we have to learn how to manage these complexities as 
they affect us at the micro level of everyday conduct. 
 
The philosophical assumptions of resilience 
 
Policy makers and those promoting the resilience discourse are not particularly interested in 
philosophical discussions about such things as complexity, subjectivity or the post-human and an 
extended account of such things will not be found by looking at policy papers. Nevertheless, explicit 
or not, resilience finds its place within a broader discourse of governance because of the ontological 
and epistemological assumptions that underpin it. These are consistent with the assumptions of 
contemporary forms of governance and they help render the world governable in certain ways. 
Before one can govern, one has to see the world in a particular way and make various ontological 
assumptions about its nature and the types of activities that take place within it. There are also 
epistemological questions about the nature and status of the knowledge we acquire and whether 
this knowledge is useful in relation to certain social practices. The idea of resilience fits comfortably 
with the prevailing ontological and epistemological commitments of most contemporary practices 
of governance. 
 
A survey of the most influential arguments in contemporary social theory tends to find a similar set 
of ontological commitments
28
, although we might note in what we termed the first approach to 
resilience, both a negative view of the wider world and a positive view of human adaptability and 
choice making. In contrast to the rather nihilistic stance of earlier postmodern approaches, more 
recent ideas, certainly among the mainstream, usually develop a more positive slant in terms of 
human decision-making. These arguments are not that dissimilar from some of the claims made 
about globalisation, most notably in the work of Anthony Giddens (although contrast Beck
29
). 
Rather than being a process that we can control, globalisation is seen as something that we have to 
learn from and adapt to. If we make the right choices, we can prosper. Behind the first approach to 
resilience lies a similar but slightly different ontological picture with the world seen as being 
beyond us, not so much because of some inherent characteristic of modernity working its way 
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through
30
, but due to the inherent complexity of all social-ecological systems. This approach lacks 
the idea of progress or development as might be found in sociological approaches to modernity, 
and is more pragmatic or realist insofar as it takes the social world as it finds it rather than viewing 
it according to some general liberal or Enlightenment norms. 
 
In terms of resilience thinking, the notion of complexity has the most obvious ontological 
implications. It is not necessarily the case that work on resilience is particularly influenced by 
complexity theory and other recent theoretical trends. However, resilience thinkers often embrace 
similar ontological assumptions, more often than not portraying the world as increasingly complex 
but also contingent, fluid and messy. It tends to reject the idea that there are stable and enduring 
social relations or steady states. As the earlier ecology literature blended with more sociological 
approaches to examine socio-ecological systems, focus was on continuous change and disturbance. 
For Folke
31
 this issue is no longer one of robustness or capacity to absorb disturbance but to 
examine dynamic adaptive interplay. Applied to societies, these arguments question the view that 
there are stable social roles, identities and functions as well as suggesting a move away from 
collective identities and actions based around such things as class or nation-state. These are said to 
have given way to complex networks of actors, each with their own individual trajectories. As Folke 
ƉƵƚƐŝƚ ?ƚŚĞƐĞŶĞƚǁŽƌŬƐ ‘ƐĞƌǀĞĂs the web that seems to tie together the adaptive governance 
system.
32
 Our social engagements have no necessity to them but are the coming together of 
diverse elements that blend together with our own particular narratives. And in order to survive 
the uncertainties of complex systems, people have to show their own initiative as active and 
reflexive agents capable of adaptive behaviour. 
 
Resilience is appealing as a policy tool because it urges a turn to ourselves and suggests a need for 
people to show initiative, enterprise and adaptability. In a more general sense, resilience is 
significant because it refocuses on subjectivity. It is possible to give this a positive spin  W as Schmidt 
says ? ‘agency resurfaces in terms of making (constant) change on inner life through learning from 
exposure to the contingencies of ontological complexity ?.33 However, this occurs in a paradoxical 
sense because this more active conception of the subject is founded on a passive conception of its 
relation to the wider social condition. Indeed, the ontological assumptions behind resilience might 
be said to be fatalistic. Resilience discourse is usually found arguing that the complex and uncertain 
nature of systems and macro-level processes means that there is little we can do in the face of 
catastrophic threats. But it is precisely for this reason that individuals, communities and 
governments need to become more proactive. As an important USAID document states, since we 
cannot do much to stop shocks from happening, we must increase adaptive capacity in order to 
respond quickly and effectively to new circumstances.
34
 Hence resilience fits with a philosophy that 
urges us to turn from a concern with the outside world to a concern with our own subjectivity, our 
adaptability, our reflexive understanding, our own risk assessments, our knowledge acquisition and, 
above all else, our responsible decision-making. Although we started with ontological assumptions 
about the bigger social world, we arrive at a view by which the best way to govern society is through 
a greater awareness of our own behaviour. Indeed, a major claim here is that the way resilience 
works, certainly in Anglo-Saxon approaches, is to move fairly swiftly from thinking about the 
dynamics of systems by denying that we can control or regulate them. If indeed systems are beyond 
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our control or even, perhaps, our understanding, then the focus should shift to the individual and 
the importance of self-reliance, adaptability and preparedness. Because of this move away from the 
idea that we can regulate or intervene effectively in the wider world to the view that consequently 
we must self-regulate and adapt our own behaviour, this position will be called governance by 
denial. 
 
Writers on resilience often embrace the conceptual vagueness and malleability of the idea as if this 
ďĞƚƚĞƌĂďůĞƚŽ ‘ŐƌĂƐƉƚŚĞĂŵďŝǀĂůĞŶƚĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨďŽƵŶĚĂƌǇŽďũĞĐƚƐ ?.35 Ontological denial that the 
 ‘ƌĞĂůǁŽƌůĚ ?ŚĂƐĂĐŽŚĞƌĞŶĐĞŽƌŐƌĂƐƉ-ability is combined with epistemological denial that we can 
have any trust in our knowledge of this world. Ontologically, the world is no longer regarded as 
amenable to effective intervention, nor can we assert that this world has a clear structure, 
underlying causes, mechanisms or actors. Resilience fits with a now dominant philosophy that 
portrays the world as one that is beyond our control and also beyond our comprehension. 
Traditional methods of analysis are no longer regarded adequate to understand this world in all its 
new found fuzziness. A combination of epistemological uncertainty, ontological contingency and 
relativism and ontological-epistemic fuzziness means that despite resilience thinking claiming its 
origins in systems theory, we are left unable, as a critic of recent trends in complexity thinking 
notes, to provide for any serious critique of broader or systemic challenge.
36
 
 
While this hinders the possibility of both social science and critical thinking, it actually has 
enhanced usefulness for contemporary governance and contributes to the instrumentalisation of 
different techniques of analysis. The paradox of contemporary understandings of the world is that 
the more uncertain we are of the bigger (global) picture, the more we must rely on the small detail 
of the little picture. Resilience-thinking fits with the return of the everyday. It turns from the grand 
projects of social engineering and universal rights to take a much more pragmatist view of social 
life. Resilience, certainly in the mainstream form of the first approach, resigns us to the view that 
the increasingly complex bigger picture is beyond both control and comprehension, that the 
human-centred project of modernity is an illusion and that we must instead pay attention to our 
(uncertain) place within the system. Rather than trying to change the world, we have to learn how 
to adapt our behaviour. The less certain we are of the wider world, the more we need detailed 
knowledge of the micro-level in order to better understand what we need to do in order to survive. 
The fuzziness of the macro world reinforces the detailed micro picture of our individual 
interactions. This is why resilience, while seeming to reject a number of significant liberal 
assumptions or to consider large scale liberal interventions as failures, should still be understood 
through a governance paradigm that the next section will understand as neoliberal 
governmentality. 
 
The distinctiveness of resilience: knowledge, the social and the human 
 
We have noted how the literature on resilience divides into two approaches. The first sees is as a 
radical new approach that opens up new ways of thinking and understanding. In this section we 
reject this overall position, but agree that resilience does offer something distinctive as an approach 
to governance. The second approach to resilience sees it in this wider context of governance, 
usually as part of a broader network of (neoliberal) governmentality. Emphasis is usually placed on 
the way this form of governance constrains activities  W captured rather well by the negative themes 
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ŽĨĨĂŝůƵƌĞĂŶĚĚĞŶŝĂů ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĐƌŝƚŝĐƐĂŵŽŶŐƚŚĞĐƌŝƚŝĐƐŚĂǀĞƌŝŐŚƚůǇĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐ ‘ƐĞůĨ-evidently 
ŶĞŽůŝďĞƌĂůĨƌĂŵŝŶŐ ?ŽĨƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞĨĂils to adequately engage with ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞƐ ?ĐůĂŝŵƐƚŚĂƚ
ĂĚĂƉƚĂƚŝŽŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ‘ĂƉŽƐŝƚŝǀĞĂŐĞŶĚĂĂŶĚĂŶĞŵƉŽǁĞƌŝŶŐƉƌŽŵŝƐĞ ?.37 
 
This section addresses these concerns by showing the difference resilience makes, particularly in 
relation to our understanding of the social and the human. In adopting the second position, it 
rejects the idea that resilience represents a fundamental shift in ways of thinking about and acting 
in the world and instead sees its arguments as consistent with existing methods of governance. It 
argues that these are predominantly neoliberal, but not exclusively so. However, in modifying and 
calibrating contemporary forms of governmentality, resilience thinking does offer something 
different. As the table below outlines, resilience collects together new ideas about knowledge, 
society and the human. This section runs these through a governmentality framework by relating 
them to governance though failure and governance through denial  W as indicated in the following 
table. 
 
 
 
 Governance through failure Governance through denial 
Knowledge Failure of modernist 
understanding 
Denial of realist claims about 
the knowability of the world 
 ‘ŽƵƚƚŚĞƌĞ ? 
  Denial of intelligibility of 
natural and social processes, 
causes, etc 
  Uncertainty about scientific 
claims and practices 
 Failure to understand 
complexity and deep 
uncertainty 
Pragmatist approach to 
ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞ ? ‘ĞƐƚĨŝƚ ?Žƌ ‘ŐŽŽĚ
ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽ
knowledge problems 
   
The social Failure of rationalist planning Denial of enduring social 
relations 
 Failure of alternative social 
projects 
Denial of social roles and 
identities 
 Failure to prevent catastrophic 
events and crises 
Denial that people and 
societies can be secured or 
protected 
 Embedded, messy, social 
context 
WƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚ ? ‘ďĞƐƚĨŝƚ ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐ
to social problems. 
Governance through the local, 
the everyday and hybrid 
solutions 
 Failure of established liberal 
frameworks as well as limits of 
neoliberal alternatives 
 
   
The human Historical failure of Denial that large scale 
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intervention to improve 
human security 
intervention can effectively 
solve human problems 
 Failure of individual autonomy Governance through human 
capacities 
 Essential human vulnerability  
 
The first approach to resilience would emphasise just how radical a change in thinking the 
resilience approach represents. This is often presented in the mainstream literature, but the 
critical approach of Chandler also embraces this view, presenting resilience as something akin to 
an epistemic shift, to use a more structuralist Foucauldian notion. For Chandler, resilience is linked 
to the emergence of complexity and is a direct challenge to the Enlightenment understanding of 
knowable laws and the autonomy of the thinking subject.
38
 
 
By contrast, the view of this article is that resilience is neither a radically new episteme in and of 
itself, nor part of a fundamental change in thinking about governance through complexity. Rather, 
it represents a challenging reflection on liberal governance from within existing practices and 
discourses. In taking the second approach of resilience as governmentality, it can be viewed as a 
critical reflection on key elements of the liberal framework of governance, but is not in itself a new 
way of doing things. Indeed, resilience has little substance of its own outside of the already 
existing discourse and practices within which it is situated. Within these it operates as a critical and 
reflexive element rather than as a radical alternative understanding. Indeed, when we step outside 
of philosophical discussions about complexity and turn instead to policy documents on resilience, 
it is often difficult to see whether resilience really does radically change either our knowledge or 
our practices. 
 
However, it is useful to distinguish between resilience as a set of practices and techniques and 
resilience as a means of framing issues of governance in particular ways. If we look at resilience only 
in terms of practices and techniques then it is easy to come to the conclusion that it is simply a 
rebranding of existing practices, albeit ones that are being scaled back in an austere period of 
denial. The real contribution of resilience at present is its way of framing questions of governance 
and in this sense it does offer something different from business as usual. In particular, most policy 
papers, particularly those dealing with ecological systems, natural disasters and climate change, are 
now framed by a pervading fatalism that changes our way of thinking about complex problems. 
Critical scholars of resilience like David Chandler are certainly right that this reflects a significant 
shift in thinking, away from some key concerns of those liberal frameworks that believe that strong 
intervention and planning can somehow control our situation. This should be qualified insofar as 
this problematisation of some key components of liberalism is not so radically new if considered in 
the context of what has been going on within Anglo-Saxon countries where neoliberal interventions 
have substantially questioned many core liberal assumptions about the relationship between state, 
market, society and individual.  
 
However, in the international sphere this does come across as a significant retreat from the grand 
scale ambitions of liberal intervention and statebuilding projects. Instead, resilience offers new 
suggestions for practice based on a recognition of some of the failures of liberal intervention and 
the universal values and beliefs that support it. As a form of knowledge this critique works through 
belief in the failure of modernist understanding to deal with and confront the principle of radical 
uncertainty. Consequently knowledge works on the basis of our perceived vulnerability and 
unpreparedness in the face of emergent and unforeseen threats. As Duffield
39
 notes, resilience 
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thinking has been able to colonise a neoliberal turn in social policy by presenting the idea of disaster 
absorbed within or internal to society as a state of permanent emergency. We might qualify this 
ĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐůŝŐŚƚůǇŝŶƐƵŐŐĞƐƚŝŶŐƚŚĂƚƚŚŝƐŝƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞŝŶƚŚĞ ‘ĂĚǀĂŶĐĞĚůŝďĞƌĂůƐŽĐŝĞƚŝĞƐ ?ǁŚĞƌĞ
governance makes use of a permanent sense of threat or potential crisis as opposed to the situation 
in poorer societies where resilient populations must deal with the effects of shocks that are all too 
real. 
 
/ŶƚŚŝƐƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶĂŐĞ ?ŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞƚĂŬĞƐĂŵŽƌĞƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĨŽƌŵ ?ůŽŽŬŝŶŐĨŽƌ ‘ďĞƐƚĨŝƚ ?Žƌ ‘ŐŽŽĚ
ĞŶŽƵŐŚ ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŽĐŽŵƉůĞǆŽƌ ‘ǁŝĐŬĞĚ ?ƉƌŽďůĞŵƐ ?dŚŝƐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞŝƐƌĞĂůŝƐƚŝŶƚŚĞƉŽůŝƚŝcal sense 
of achieving certain ends or goals, but anti-realist in the scientific or philosophical sense of 
believing that the world is ordered in a certain way and is open to investigation.
40
 Hence the 
knowledge claims underpinning resilience tend to undermine the scientific belief in intelligible 
natural and social processes, underlying causes and identifiable mechanisms. It fits in with current 
doubts toward scientific claims and practices. The ability to present disasters as internal to society 
is premised on a denial of our ability to comprehend anything beyond. More pragmatic forms of 
governance are premised on our perceived failure to understand complexity and deep uncertainty.  
 
The second distinctive feature of the resilience approach is its attitude towards the social. Again 
this adds something different to existing strategies of governance, but it modifies and re-calibrates 
existing techniques rather than representing a more significant epistemic shift. It recognises 
human activity to be embedded within a social context and it looks for ways of drawing on societal 
resources in order to strengthen our ability to face challenges. As a strategy of governmentality it 
works by placing emphasis on the need for people themselves to address their resilience strategies 
in order to make themselves less vulnerable and prone to hardship. 
 
This view of humans as socially embedded represents a partial rejection of the idea that we are 
autonomous, rational, calculating individuals. Instead, resilience highlights our essential 
vulnerability through the messy social relations and entanglements we find ourselves in. This turn 
to the social is somewhat impoverished however, premised on a rejection of classical sociological 
views in favour of contemporary arguments about the networked, fluid and contingent character 
of social relations. This view of the social is based on the denial that such social relations have an 
enduring character, that they have a hierarchy or order, or that the people within these relations 
can have stable social roles and identities. It deems past attempts at ordering social life to be 
failures. It rejects alternative social projects and questions top-down state intervention to regulate 
social life. As noted, resilience fits with the questioning of rationalist planning and large-scale 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝŶĨĂǀŽƵƌŽĨƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝƐƚ ? ‘ďĞƐƚĨŝƚ ?ƐŽůƵƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƐĞƚŚĞŵĞƐƐǇ ?ĞǀĞƌǇĚĂǇ
character of social life.  
 
Indeed, such a view is not at all inconsistent with neoliberal governmentality which has always, as 
Dean
41
 among others has noted, maintained a view of individual freedom as socially constructed 
within complex social and institutional frameworks. This networked understanding of the social 
modifies and develops existing views about social capital and other capacities. According to these 
views, social capital reflects social networks and formal and informal rules and norms that mediate 
our interactions with one another as well as with our environment. For some resilience advocates 
ǁĞĐĂŶĂĚĚ ‘ĂĚĂƉƚŝǀĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇ ?ĂƐĂĨŽƌŵŽĨĐĂƉŝƚĂůƚŚĂƚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐŽƵƌĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĞǆƉĞƌŝŵĞŶƚ ?ůĞĂƌŶĂŶĚ
adopt novel solutions in the face of severe challenges.
42
 Again, this is premised on the belief that 
we cannot protect ourselves against catastrophic events and crises and that governance through 
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failure instead encourages us to be resourceful in the face of adversity by making full use of social 
(and adaptive) resources and networks. 
 
As Chandler rightly notes,
43
 this represents a shift from a subject-centred to a relational 
understanding of our problems that raises questions about individual autonomy by emphasizing 
connectedness and social embeddedness. This can be found in strategy papers for international 
interventions such as a recent DFID approach paper from the UK which argues that resilience needs 
to be contextualised and understood in relation to a social group, socio-economic or political 
system, environmental context or institution.
44
 The mix of social, institutional and human capacities, 
as well as the tensions these entail, is neatly captured in the following passage from another DFID 
paper:  
 
Resilience refers to the ability to absorb and recover from hazard impacts. For many 
analysts it is the opposite of vulnerability (and thus much the same as capacity), though 
others make the useful distinction between capacities as attributes of individuals and 
households, and resilience which also includes a favourable institutional environment. 
From this latter perspective, resilience is the coming together of such capacities with the 
social, institutional and informational resources that enable their effective use.
45
 
 
The mix of institutional capacities and the capacities and attributes of individuals constitutes an 
important issue in how to understand international interventions with the normal emphasis being 
on the need to build institutional capacities. Recent discussions of resilience offer something 
different  W indeed they perhaps represent a belief that institutional capacity approaches have failed 
in their objectives. Hence, there is a turn to building human capacities, with resilience strategies 
placing more emphasis on building resilient individuals and communities rather than institutions. To 
do this, certain human qualities are invoked. These human qualities are considered beyond both the 
institutional approach and the logic of economic markets insofar as they do not conform to the 
normally assumed model of rational-calculative behaviour. ^ŽŵĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚƐ ?ůŝŬĞDĂƌŬĞǀŝƌ ?Ɛ46 
make the point that a new wave of governance has become less market-oriented by promoting new 
networks and alliances. Resilience can be said to be a part of this new mix of practices or variegated 
governance, some elements of which appear to be more aware of the limits of markets and rational-
calculation. Olaf Corry makes a similar point that resilience can appear in multiple discourses of 
governance which compete with one another, rather than forming a fully constituted regime.
47
 
These arguments are not incorrect, but this does not necessarily mean that we are heading towards 
a richer understanding of the social and the human. 
 
Bevir is right that recent governance approaches shift away from purely neoclassical economics to 
more emphasis on networks and connections. But ultimately the market is promoted through such 
networks just as it is in the more established notion of social capital that tries (and has perhaps 
failed) to fill the gaps in market rationality by introducing a more social element. Likewise, the 
human turn has already been anticipated in work ƐƵĐŚĂƐŵĂƌƚǇĂ^ĞŶ ?ƐǁŚŝĐŚŵĂŬĞƐĂĚŝƌĞĐƚ
appeal to individual human capacities as the basis for a new logic of development.
48
 While 
seemingly critical of mainstream thinking, such arguments remain consistent with neoliberal and 
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market-based technologies of governance insofar as they shift focus from the bigger picture to the 
micro level and promote a view of humans as innovative, enterprising and risk-taking.  
 
It may be possible that through actual human struggles, a richer understanding of social and the 
human might be achieved. However, the dominant understandings at the international level are 
those put forward by the main international organisations and actors, rather than the grassroots. 
They thus represent more of a critical reflection on the failures of institution building, rather than an 
alternative to market logic. Resilience does encourage a more social or human way of thinking 
though its focus on reflexive awareness of our embedded social context. But while there might be 
some potential in interpreting this in such a way as to emphasise human qualities such as empathy, 
solidarity, togetherness and understanding, the resilience policy-making literature interprets the 
human through the lens of governance and therefore according to such things as our capacity to 
learn, reflect and adapt.  
 
According to the first approach to resilience, we must accept the ways of the word and find freedom 
elsewhere  W in the everyday life choices we make, or in the subjective realm of our inner life. 
According to the second approach, this constitutes a form of governmentality that does perhaps 
govern through a certain idea of the social and the human, but denies the true possibilities that 
human agency might realise. Obviously there is something intangibly human about resilience and 
our desire to survive and overcome adversity. But thus far, the potential appeal to human 
empowerment that resilience might offer
49
 does not appear to materialise in the realm of global 
governance. 
 
 
Global governing through failure and denial 
 
We have set out a theory of governance through denial based on the futility of trying to influence 
the wider world while paying more intensive regard to our individual conduct and social interaction. 
This fits with the second approach to resilience outlined at the start of this article as resilience as 
governmentality, usually of an embedded neoliberal character.
50
 This places emphasis not on the 
enabling role of resilience practices, but on the limiting and constraining effects of resilience as (part 
of) a strategy of governance. Understood as governmentality, this ties in with the notion of 
governing from a distance. Although this can be explored in relation to domestic policy making, this 
section seeks to outline this connection to governmentality in relation to international 
interventions. By focusing on interventions, this section begins very much with the idea of governing 
through failure. Indeed global governance is full of failures with the notions of failed states, poor 
governance and weak capacities now joined by the idea of failed liberal internationalism.  Indeed, 
global governance increasingly operates through a belief in the historical failure of intervention. In 
this sense it is part of the human security turn, but brings with it something of a critique, or at least 
a denial of the effectiveness of liberal universalism, combining with arguments in current 
statebuilding, peacekeeping and development strategy which start to pay some lip-service to the 
local or which are forced to react pragmatically. ZĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĂďŝůŝƚǇƚŽĐŽůŽŶŝƐĞƚŚĞglobal 
governance discourse is dependent on this perceived failure of past intervention and the irony is 
that this past failure helps rejuvenate governance through denial, allowing international actors to 
step back and transfer responsibility to local populations and states. 
 
Global governmentality, like domestic forms, works from a distance through invoking private and 
civil society actors. It governs through the market and the competences of the private sector and 
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increasingly sees its role as one of facilitation. It lowers expectations of what international 
organisations and Western governments will do directly, claiming to have learned from past failures 
by refocusing on local capacities. The structural aspects of failure are evident in some of the wider 
literature in this field and can be mentioned briefly as issues for further examination. Hybridity, 
according to Richmond, refers to a tense, conflictual and ultimately accommodating process of 
peace configurations worked out across a range of different actors, contexts and normative 
frameworks.
51
 The hybridity literature rightly emphasises how this arises as a result of local agency 
challenging dominant frameworks of intervention. However, the context for this is to be found in 
structural failings, perhaps better accounted for through the idea of decoupling.
52
 This occurs when 
the general convergence or diffusion of (liberal) norms and institutions is decoupled from local 
practice. In both cases, hybridity and decoupling may actually be necessary in order to overcome 
evident structural failures through embracing certain local or everyday norms and practices. As far 
as this impacts on forms of governance, it does indeed imply structurally produced chinks and 
glitches, agential challenges and logics that might disrupt neoliberal rule.
53
 
 
Once this is recognised, resilience may build on this, by shifting the focus away from external 
interventions and on to local agents.
54
 However, as noted, resilience, as currently understood, does 
this mainly by emphasising the ideas of responsibility, self-awareness and self-regulation in 
response to crises and uncertainties. It remains committed to the capacity-building approach of 
existing interventions but modifies this by recognising the failings of liberal peace and statebuilding 
approaches and emphasising a more practical and flexible understanding of particular challenges. 
Implicit is a critique of centralised, anticipated planning though a belief that governance is context-
ďŽƵŶĚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇŝƐŝŶĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚŇƵǆ ?Recognising the failure of past interventions while 
embracing resilience as a way of dealing with ongoing failure both enables and enhances a more 
varied approach to governance. As Haldrup and Rosén argue, these kind of approaches retain focus 
on capacity development, but place more emphasis on practical experience and flexible 
understanding, claiming learning by doing, and addressing challenges as they emerge.
55
 For the 
international actors it is governance by denial insofar as it claims not to be a form of direct 
involvement, working instead through more distant processes of  ‘ŚĂŶĚƐŽĨĨĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?.56 By 
contrast,  ‘ŚĂŶĚƐŽŶ ?ŝŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶŝƐĚĞĞŵĞĚƚŽďĞĂĨĂŝůƵƌĞ ?ƐŽŵƵĐŚƐŽƚŚĂƚ ‘ĚŽŶŽŚĂƌŵ ?ŶŽǁ
ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐĂƐůŝďĞƌĂůŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐŵ ?ƐŐƵŝĚŝŶŐƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞĨŽƌƉĞĂĐĞďƵŝůĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ? 
 
As discussed above, focus on the human modifies recent failures of institutional capacity building 
approaches of liberal statebuilding and development strategy. Haldrup and Rosén draw this out 
through an examination of the UNDP in Kosova, Afghanistan and elsewhere. They note a change in 
vocabulary from capacity building to  ‘ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚŵĞĂŶƐĨŽĐƵƐing on existing 
endogenous capabilities of people and communities, and using coaching and mentoring 
programmes try to develop these. This appeals to the existing discourse of local ownership and 
bottom-up approaches while moving away from large scale institution building  W  ‘ŵĂŬŝŶŐǁŚĂƚĞǀĞƌ
structures do exist resilient through propping up the individual capacities of the people running 
                                                          
51
 Oliver P. ZŝĐŚŵŽŶĚ ‘dŚĞŝůĞŵŵĂƐŽĨĂ,ǇďƌŝĚWĞĂĐĞ PEĞŐĂƚŝǀĞŽƌWŽƐŝƚŝǀĞ ? ? ?Cooperation and Conflict 
50, no.1 (2015): 50-68 
52
 ZǇĂŶ'ŽŽĚŵĂŶĂŶĚĞƌĞŬ:ŝŶŬƐ ‘/ŶĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶĚŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ,ƵŵĂŶZŝŐŚƚƐ>Ăǁ ? ?
European Journal of International Law 19, no. 4 (2008): 725 W748. 
53
 ŽƌƌǇ ? ‘&ƌŽŵĞĨĞŶĞƐĞƚŽZĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? 
54
 For the challenges this presents see Philippe BŽƵƌďĞĂƵ ? ‘Resilience and International Politics: Premises, 
ĞďĂƚĞƐ ?ŐĞŶĚĂ ? ?International Studies Review, 17, no.3 (2015): 374-395. 
55^ƆƌĞŶsĞƐƚĞƌ,ĂůĚƌƵƉĂŶĚ&ƌĞĚĞƌŝŬZŽƐĠŶ ? ‘ĞǀĞůŽƉŝŶŐZĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞ PZĞƚƌĞĂƚĨƌŽŵ'ƌĂŶĚWůĂŶŶŝŶŐ ? ?
Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses, 1, no. 2 (2013): 130-145. 142. 
56
 Ibid., 143 
15 
 
ƚŚĞŵ ? ?57  ‘ĐŽĂĐŚŝŶŐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚ ?ƌĞƉůĂĐĞƐůĂƌŐĞƐĐĂůĞƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚĂŵŽƌĞƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚƚŚĂƚ
works with what already exists in a more flexible way which responds to challenges as they emerge. 
It is evident in resilience approaches that emphasises practical experience and learning by doing.
58
 
The resilient subject is no longer conceived of as a passive victim to be saved, but is now understood 
as an active agent, capable of achieving self-transformation.
59
 This can be presented in a positive 
way as enabling local initiative and building upon local capacities. 
 
ŶĂƚƚĞŵƉƚƚŽƌĞĐŽŶĐŝůĞƚŚĞĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚŽƌ ‘ĐŽĂĐŚŝŶŐ ?approach of resilience with the 
more established institution / capacity building approach is particularly noticeable in a recent 
World Bank Development Report which argues for both a predictable institutional framework 
and the greater promotion of flexibility in order to best promote resilience and make the most of 
opportunities.
60
 The report continues the discourse of uncertainty: 
 
As the world changes, new opportunities and possibilities, as well as risks and 
complications, continually arise. Rejecting or ignoring change can lead to stagnation and 
impoverishment. In contrast, embracing change and proactively dealing with risks can 
open the way to sustained progress. Risk management should therefore be a central 
concern at all levels of society. By improving resilience, risk management has the 
potential to bring about a sense of security and the means for people in developing 
countries and beyond to achieve progress.
61
 
 
Existing solutions are seen as difficult to apply in situations of  ‘deep ? or large uncertainty. It is 
argued, therefore, that conditions of uncertainty require greater compromises, more consensual 
solutions, and solutions that reflect the different beliefs and values of various stakeholders.
62
 The 
tŽƌůĚĂŶŬĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚŵŝŐŚƚďĞĐŽŵƉĂƌĞĚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĚĞǀĞůŽƉŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĂƐŝĚĞŶƚŝĨŝĞĚ
in ,ĂůĚƌƵƉĂŶĚZŽƐĠŶ ?ƐĞǆĂŵŝŶĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞhEW ?dŽƉƵƚƚŚŝƐŝŶ ƚŚĞtŽƌůĚĂŶŬ ?ƐǁŽƌĚƐ P 
 
Choose flexible solutions and build in learning. To cope with uncertainty and differences 
in beliefs, values, and sensitivity, policy makers should aim for robust policies that may 
not be optimal in the most likely future but that lead to acceptable outcomes in a large 
range of scenarios and that are adaptive and flexible: that is, policies that are easy to 
revise as new information becomes available. More learning, and an iterative process of 
monitoring and learning, is needed about how to apply risk management approaches, 
especially in lower-income environments
63
 
 
As might be expected, the World Bank promotes this as an enterprise model where the key to 
resilience and prosperity is to promote vibrant enterprise and innovation. Firms are seen as the 
 ‘ŶĂƚƵƌĂůǀĞŚŝĐůĞƐ ?ĨŽƌĞǆƉůŽŝƚŝŶŐŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞŵĂŝŶďĂƐŝƐĨŽƌŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ƌĞƐŝůŝĞŶĐĞĂŶĚ
prosperity.
64
 However, the World Bank continues to talk of the need for the state to provide 
strong institutions as ĂŶ ‘ĞŶĂďůŝŶŐĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĨŽƌŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞƐŚŽƌƚƚĞƌŵ and 
formality in the long run.
65
  
 
So resilience thinking, while offering a different focus on human capacities continues to accept 
the need for an institutional approach while recognising past failures at such efforts and the 
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need for more flexible solutions. One way of arguing this is to stress a multi-level approach to 
governance through resilience. For example, DFID argues for a multi-level approach to adaptive 
capacity. Shocks, stress and subsequent transformation are inevitable, but awareness of 
consequences and potential opportunities is vital: 
 
The adaptive capacities of actors  W individuals, communities, regions, governments, 
organisations or institutions  W are determined by their ability to adjust to a disturbance, 
moderate potential damage, take advantage of opportunities and cope with the 
consequences of a transformation. Adaptive capacities allow actors to anticipate, plan, 
react to, and learn from shocks or stresses.
66
 
 
Where possible this carries responsibility down to the level of communities, citizens and 
individuals. The Interagency Resilience Working Group  W a body comprised of DFID and various 
specialised agencies and UK INGOs  W argues that the key to resilience is flexibility understood as 
ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůƐ ?ŚŽƵƐĞŚŽůĚƐ ?ĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚŝĞƐŽƌƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ‘ƚŽďĞĂďůĞƚŽĐŚĂŶŐĞƚhe way they 
operate or function to respond to shifts in the context due to a range of political, social, cultural, 
ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂŶĚĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚĂůƐŚŽĐŬƐĂŶĚƐƚƌĞƐƐĞƐ ? ?67 But given the nature of the international 
domain and the varying possibilities within various different social contexts, the main aim of 
international development still lies in responsibilising the appropriate national governments and 
perhaps regional organisations as the main bodies who should attempt to do this. Global 
governance and international intervention is somewhat different from the domestic where an 
ĂƌƌĂǇŽĨƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐŽĨ ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŝŶŐƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ĐĂŶďĞĚĞƉůŽǇĞĚ ?Certainly as far as the UN and 
ŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůĚŽŶŽƌƐĂƌĞĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚ ?ƚŚĞƐƚĂƚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶƐƚŚĞ ‘ĞŶƚƌǇƉŽŝŶƚ ?68 for activities such as 
peacebuilding which rarely focus on political entities other than states even if the discourse itself 
presents a more societal, internationalist or normative perspective. It remains to be seen whether 
the resilience discourse will be strong enough to make any difference to this or whether the focus 
on human and social qualities (or capacities) will remain as  ‘ƐŽĐŝĞƚĂůƚĞĐŚŶŝƋƵĞƐ ?ƵůƚŝŵĂƚĞůǇĂŝŵĞĚ
at putting pressure on states to conform to global norms of behaviour.  
 
  
 
Conclusion 
 
This conclusion returns to the framing devices of failure and denial. While not elaborated in any 
great detail in policy documents or strategy papers, the underlying position is clear. The world is 
seen as a far more dangerous, risky and unpredictable place. This might be down to political factors 
ƐƵĐŚĂƐƚŚĞĞŶĚŽĨƚŚĞŽůĚtĂƌ ?ƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨŶĞǁƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇƚŚƌĞĂƚƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŐůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨ
risks. Or it may be a belated realisation that we are living with complexity and that older, modernist 
or classical ways of understanding the world  W whether practical, scientific or political  W are now 
exposed as failing to deliver. Whatever the reason, there is a common belief that we cannot go on 
acting in the same way and that rather than attempting to control systems, we have to learn how to 
adapt to live with them. 
 
In terms of development strategy and forms of international intervention, these ontological and 
epistemological assumptions about the complexity of the world and the limits of our knowledge 
have led to a widespread belief that liberal internationalist interventions have failed. These 
arguments lack elaboration, but act as important framing devices in order to fine tune strategies 
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of governance through invoking social and human qualities (or capacities). The rise of resilience as 
a new strategy reflects this belief and the need to turn away from grand projects that seek control 
of systems to a more pragmatic belief in the need to adapt human and social behaviour. Seen 
through a governmentality lens, this reflects a devolution of responsibilities. Domestically states 
and governments deny that they can regulate and control systems and instead shift responsibility 
on to individuals and communities. Internationally the most powerful states and international 
organisations deny that they either have the power or responsibility to solve problems of 
development and humanitarian and disaster response, claiming instead to be intervening to help 
poorer states and communities to enhance their own resilience capacities. It is on this basis that 
resilience supports a governance turn towards the subject, the social and the human. 
 
Rather than reflecting a withdrawal from intervention, this instead represents a developing form 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶĂŶĐĞƚŚĂƚŽƉĞƌĂƚĞƐ ‘ĨƌŽŵĂĚŝƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ďǇŵĞĂŶƐŽĨƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝbilisation, in order that poorer 
people and countries should now take upon themselves the burden of being resilient, while 
their efforts  W and often failures  W to do this are subject to careful monitoring and evaluation. 
Hence the failure of interventions is used, not to reject intervention as such, but to reject a 
certain type of intervention and to justify a certain type of governing. This works through denial 
and transference of responsibility, attempting to reach right down to the social and human 
dimensions even if a focus on states and institutional capacity remains in play. As the more 
positive view of resilience notes, it does indeed offer human agents certain possibilities. But this 
tends to be confined to the subjective realm of the everyday and this operates precisely in order 
to tighten a form of governance that works through the denial that we can be effective agents in 
the wider world. 
